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Over the last three years, the
Health Care Fraud Prevention and
Enforcement Action Team (“HEAT”)
has recovered over $10.2 billion in
healthcare fraud settlements, many
involving pharmaceutical companies
charged with the “off-label promotion”1
of drugs to healthcare providers.2 As an
effort to change corporate culture, each
of these settlements has included a corporate integrity agreement (“CIA”)
with the Office of Inspector General
(“OIG”) for the Department of Health
and Human Services (“HHS”). The
deterrent effect of CIAs, however, is
uncertain, 3 and even the OIG has
acknowledged that billion dollar settlements are not a sufficient deterrent to
change corporate culture in pharmaceutical companies.4 Moreover, some
companies view paying these fines as
merely the “cost of doing business.”5
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One reason for the lack of deterrence may be that pharmaceutical
companies believe they are “too big”6
to be excluded by the OIG because of
the risk it would pose to the welfare of
government healthcare beneficiaries.7
Another reason may be due to the failure of the laws governing “directors’
exercise of their fiduciary duties to
impel boards to pursue their company’s
strict adherence to the law”8 and fully
embrace “compliance as good business.” While some alternatives have
been offered,9 the OIG has responded
by indicating its intent to exclude
corporate executives in the life sciences
industry from federal healthcare programs “under a broader range of
circumstances,”10 including the Responsible Corporate Officer (“RCO”)
doctrine.11 For example, HHS Deputy
Inspector General Gerald T. Roy testified to Congress that the OIG would
operate “with a presumption in favor
of exclusion” when there is “evidence
that an executive knew or should have
known of the underlying criminal
misconduct of the organization.”12 By
excluding corporate officers, the
OIG believes it can better “influence
continued on page 3
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corporate behavior without putting
patient access to care at risk” and “alter
the cost-benefit calculus of the corporate
executives who run these companies.”13
Holding true to its promise, the
OIG excluded three former Purdue
Frederick Company (“Purdue”) executives in 2007 for their misdemeanor
misbranding convictions under the
RCO doctrine. On July 27, 2012, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit upheld their
exclusions in Friedman v. Sebelius
because the executives’ misdemeanor
convictions were factually related to
fraud. The Court remanded the case
back to the District Court regarding
the 12-year exclusion length because
the OIG failed to explain why the
penalty was three times longer than
penalties imposed in comparable
cases in the past14 and four times longer than the presumptive baseline in
the statute.15 The D.C. Circuit Court
denied a petition for rehearing en
banc by the executives on Nov. 29,
2012.16 The Court mandated the case
back to the District Court, which
remanded the case to the OIG on
December 12, 2012.17
Consequently, lawyers and
healthcare stakeholders must closely
examine this decision because the
OIG may “expand its use of [permissive] exclusion against individuals”18
and the decision may encourage more
RCO prosecutions. As a result, these
exclusions may have the unintended
consequence of deterring “talented,
qualified, and ethical individuals from
working in senior or leadership positions”19 in the life sciences industry
for fear of being excluded when they
engaged in no wrongful conduct.

Case Background
In May 2007, Purdue pled guilty
to felony misbranding, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 331(a) and § 333(a)(2)
of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act

(“FDCA”), because some of Purdue’s
employees made misrepresentations
to healthcare providers that the painkiller OxyContin was less addictive,
less subject to abuse and diversion,
and less likely to cause tolerance and
withdrawal than other pain medications.20 Purdue was placed on probation
for five years, fined $500,000, and subjected to other monetary sanctions
totaling approximately $600 million, of
which approximately $160 million was
earmarked for restitution to federal and
state healthcare agencies.21 At the same
time, the three executives22 each pled
guilty to a single count of misdemeanor
misbranding as “responsible corporate
officers,” in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 331(a) and § 333(a)(1), for their
admitted failure to prevent Purdue’s
fraudulent marketing of OxyContin.
The RCO Doctrine
The RCO doctrine has its roots
in two Supreme Court cases: U.S. v.
Dotterweich23 and U.S. v. Park.24 In
Dotterweich, prosecutors obtained a
misdemeanor conviction of the general manager of a store that sold
repackaged drugs when, without his
knowledge or involvement, a shipment was made to a physician that
contained less potent drugs than indicated on the label. In a 5-4 decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
conviction, finding that the general
manager bore “a responsible share in
the furtherance of the transaction
which the statute outlaws.” 25 The
Court declined to explain the meaning of “responsible share.”26
The Supreme Court elaborated
on the Dotterweich holding in Park,
where the president and chief executive officer (“CEO”) of a national
grocery chain with 900 stores was
charged with a misdemeanor for selling adulterated food. Although Park
claimed that he was not “personally
concerned” with the violations,27 the
government presented testimony that
“[the Food and Drug Administration

(“FDA”)] informed him, by letter, of
unsanitary conditions in the store’s
Baltimore warehouse.”28 The Supreme
Court instructed that:
the government establishes a
prima facie case when it introduces evidence sufficient to
warrant a finding by the trier of
the facts that the defendant had,
by reason of his position in the
corporation responsibility and
authority either to prevent in the
first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of,
and that he failed to do so.29
As a result, the Court held that a
“corporate agent, through whose act,
default, or omission the corporation
committed a crime” in violation of the
FDCA may be held criminally liable
for the wrongdoing of the corporation
or lower-level corporate employees,
“whether or not the crime required
‘consciousness of wrongdoing’” by the
agent.30 In other words, criminal liability for an FDCA violation does not
require “awareness of some wrongdoing” or “conscious fraud.”31
In addition, criminal liability
under the RCO doctrine extends “not
only to those corporate agents who
themselves committed the criminal
act, but also to those who by virtue of
their managerial positions or other
similar relation to the actor could be
deemed responsible for its commission.” 32 A corporate officer may
therefore be guilty of misdemeanor
misbranding without “knowledge of, or
personal participation in,” the underlying fraudulent conduct. 33 Thus, the
word “responsible” in the doctrine’s
name does not mean that the individual is responsible for the misconduct,
but…for the corporation.” 34 As a
result, the Court in Park imposed the
“highest standard of care” on corporate
executives, thereby permitting conviction of such “responsible corporate
officials who, in light of this standard
of care, have the power to prevent or
continued on page 4
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correct violations of its provisions.”35
The Court recognized that this high
standard imposed on responsible corporate agents was “no more stringent
than the public has a right to expect of
those who voluntarily assume positions
of authority in business enterprises
whose services and products affect the
health and well-being of the public
that supports them.”36
The Court in Park did create a
defense that corporate officers are
not expected to prevent or remedy
wrongdoing by doing the “objectively
impossible.” 37 As the Washington
Legal Foundation38 noted in its Friedman amicus brief, however, “[t]his
defense is surely more useful to midlevel executives than to senior level
executives.”39 Even if the most “thorough and assiduous supervision
produced no evidence of a problem, it
would always be objectively possible for
a CEO, who has authority over a company, to have prevented wrongdoing.”40
After Park, the RCO doctrine was
“infrequently relied upon, and when it
was invoked, it was typically in cases
where the individual either participated in or knew of the wrongful
conduct.”41 In fact, the government’s
brief in Park acknowledged that the
FDA would not “ordinarily recommend prosecution unless that official,
after becoming aware of possible violations…has failed to correct them or to
change his managerial system so as to
prevent further violations.”42 In addition, FDA officials did not use the
doctrine because the agency was
focused on felony cases.43
In 2010, however, FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, PhD,
sent a letter to Senator Charles
Grassley (R-IA) explaining that the
agency had decided to “increase the
appropriate use of misdemeanor
prosecutions [as] a valuable enforcement tool to hold responsible
officials accountable.” 44 The FDA
subsequently updated its Regulatory
Procedures Manual to add a new

section on Park Doctrine prosecutions. 45 In addition, former FDA
Deputy Chief for Litigation Eric Blumberg noted that FDA would target
“pharmaceutical executives whose
companies promoted off-label uses of
their products” for misdemeanor prosecutions and urged federal prosecutors
to “show[] more resolve to criminally
charge individuals at all levels in the
company. 46 The Washington Legal
Foundation responded to Blumberg
with a letter, calling his comments
“irresponsible” and urging the FDA
not to pursue Park prosecutions where
“the individual in question did not
participate in or have knowledge of
the alleged violations.”47
In Friedman, the D.C. Circuit
reasoned that because the executives,
as part of their plea agreements,
admitted having “responsibility and
authority either to prevent in the first
instance or to promptly correct” the
misbranding, the executives admitted
being guilty of misdemeanor misbranding under the RCO doctrine.48
However, both the presiding judge
who accepted the corporate and executive plea agreements and the
prosecuting U.S. Attorney recognized
the absence of any proof that the
executives had any personal knowledge of the misbranding or any
personal intent to defraud.49

excluded individual to be employed in
the healthcare industry, since most
pharmaceutical companies rely on revenue from federal healthcare programs.
The OIG’s Exclusion
Authority and Relation to
Corporate Executives
Four months after the executives
were sentenced, the OIG informed
them of its intent to exclude them
from participating in any federal
healthcare program for 20 years, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(1).
Exclusions, often referred to in the
industry as the “economic death penalty,” are “remedial in nature, not
punitive.” 54 They are a paymentrelated sanction, and if excluded, the
government may not make any payment for any items or services billed to
a federal healthcare program by the
excluded individual or entity. The
OIG has mandatory and permissive
exclusion authority. Under the mandatory authority, the OIG must exclude
any individual from participation in
any federal healthcare program who is
convicted of: (1) a program-related
crime; 55 (2) an offense relating to
patient abuse;56 (3) a felony relating to
healthcare fraud; 57 or (4) a felony
relating to controlled substances.58

Consequently, the District
Court’s holding established an unfamiliar precedent under the RCO
doctrine. Previously, the Supreme
Court only recognized narrow exceptions for the mens rea requirement in
the case of misdemeanor charges
under the FDCA’s RCO doctrine
because the penalties were “relatively small”50 and conviction did no
“grave damage” to the person’s reputation.51 The executives in Friedman,
however, had to disgorge approximately
$34.5 million52 in compensation and
faced what amounted to a lifetime ban
from the pharmaceutical industry.53 It
is practically impossible for an

Under the OIG’s permissive exclusion authority, the agency may exclude
an individual “based on a host of lesser
offenses and even affiliations with sanctioned entities.”59 In the Friedman case,
the OIG pursued permissive exclusion
under Section (b)(1), which allows the
OIG to exclude an individual convicted of a “misdemeanor relating to
fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of
fiduciary responsibility, or other financial misconduct.”60 The OIG may also
permissively exclude any individual
“who has a direct or indirect ownership
or control interest in a sanctioned
entity61 and who knows or should know
of the action constituting the basis for
the [sanction]; or who is an officer or
managing employee of such an entity.”62
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Although the OIG has relied upon this
paragraph only approximately 30 times
since 1996, mostly against individuals
who controlled small businesses,63 the
OIG issued guidance64 in October 2010
on its permissive exclusion authority
under Section 1320a-7(b)(15), “which
encourages greater consideration and use
of this power”65 to exclude executives.
The OIG released the guidance while
the Purdue executives’ case was pending.
The guidance explains that the
OIG will exercise a presumption in
favor of exclusion under section (b)
(15) where there is evidence that an
owner, officer, or managing employee66
knew or should have known of the
conduct leading to the exclusion or
conviction of the entity, unless “significant factors” weigh against
exclusion. In the absence of such evidence, the “OIG will apply the
enumerated nonbinding factors in
determining whether to exclude an
officer or managing employee.”67
First, the OIG will consider the “circumstances of the misconduct and
seriousness of the offense,” which
includes (a) the nature and scope of the
misconduct and any related misconduct;
(b) the level within the entity at which
the misconduct occurred;68 (c) the
nature and scope of criminal and civil
sanctions imposed on the entity; (d)
whether the misconduct resulted in
actual or potential harm to beneficiaries
or financial harm to any persons or programs; and (e) whether the misconduct
was an isolated incident or part of larger
pattern of wrongdoing. Second, the OIG
will consider the “individual’s role in the
sanctioned entity,” including the individual’s current and former position(s) in
the company; the degree of managerial
authority or control exercised by the
individual; and whether the misconduct
occurred within the individual’s chain
of command.69
Third, the OIG will consider the
“individual’s action in response to the
misconduct.”70 This includes whether
the individual acted to stop the underlying misconduct or mitigate the
effects of the misconduct; whether the

individual’s actions to stop or mitigate
the misconduct occurred before or
after the individual learned of the government’s investigation; and whether
the individual disclosed the misconduct to the appropriate authorities and
cooperated with investigators and
prosecutors. If the individual can demonstrate either that preventing the
misconduct was impossible or that the
individual exercised extraordinary care
but still could not prevent the conduct, the OIG may consider this as a
factor weighing against exclusion.
Finally, the OIG will consider “information about the entity,” including
any previous sanctions or convictions
by any federal or state government;
and the size and corporate structure of
the company.71 Despite these criteria,
the OIG may still exclude officers and
managing employees “based solely on
their position within the entity.”72
The FDA’s updated Regulatory
Procedures Manual outlined the use
of similar criteria. For example, the
Manual provides that when considering prosecution against a corporate
official, the FDA should consider “the
individual’s position in the company
and relationship to the violation, and
whether the official had the authority
to correct or prevent the violation.”73
The FDA clarified that “[k]nowledge
of and actual participation in the
violation are not a prerequisite to a
misdemeanor prosecution but are factors that may be relevant.” 74 The
Manual also added a non-exhaustive
list of other considerations, many
relating to the nature of the violat i o n . 7 5 C o n s e q u e n t l y, f e d e r a l
healthcare enforcement authorities
have used the OIG’s permissive exclusion guidance and the FDA’s recently
updated Manual to prosecute several
corporate officers in the last few years.
Examples of the OIG’s
Exclusion Efforts Against
Corporate Executives
Shortly after issuing its guidance, the OIG expressed its intent
to expand the application of section

(b)(15) to exclude executives of large
complex organizations such as a drug or
device manufacturer. One reason for
the OIG’s decision to expand (b)(15)’s
application to executives was because
the agency was “concerned about
criminal conduct” and maintained
that its remedy in civil cases – CIAs –
was “not sufficient to protect programs
going forward and provide a deterrent.”76
Demonstrating its intent, the
OIG first used (b)(15) to exclude
Marc Hermelin,77 former Chairman
of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of KV Pharmaceutical Co., on
November 18, 2010.78 On December
7, 2010, Gregory Demske, Assistant
Inspector General, characterized this
exclusion as a “preview of things to
come.”79
Interestingly, Hermelin was not
charged or convicted at the time of his
exclusion. Instead, the OIG pursued
his exclusion because Hermelin “was
identified in the information in the
criminal conviction;” there was evidence that he “was involved in what
the company pled guilty to;” and there
was evidence that Hermelin had made
certain determinations about what to
report and what not to report to the
FDA.” 80 Hermelin eventually pled
guilty in March 2011 to two counts of
misdemeanor misbranding as a
responsible corporate officer, was sentenced to 30 days in jail, and ordered
to pay $1.9 million in fines and forfeitures.81 Like the Purdue executives,
however, the government did not
charge Hermelin with personal knowledge or intent.82 KV itself could have
faced mandatory exclusion as well for
being controlled and owned in majority by Hermelin; however, the OIG did
not seek exclusion of KV once Hermelin divested himself.83
The OIG also proposed excluding
Howard Solomon 84 of Forest Pharmaceuticals85 under Section (b)(15).
Unlike the executives in the Friedman
case who had admitted to misdemeanor criminal conduct pursuant to
the RCO doctrine, Solomon had not
admitted to any criminal intent or
continued on page 6
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failures and was never charged. Thus,
the OIG’s proposed exclusion was
based solely on Solomon’s position as a
“responsible corporate officer” and that
he was “associated with” Forest.86 The
Wall Street Journal reported that the
attempt was “raising alarms in that
industry and beyond about a potential
expansion of federal involvement in
the business world.”87 The OIG, however, dropped the exclusion action
against Solomon without any explanation. 88 Interestingly, the OIG also
contemplated excluding seven other
top executives of Forest and informed
the company of this possibility in
September 2010.89
The OIG also has not yet pursued
the exclusion of Gary Osborn, owner
of Apothécure Inc., a compounding
pharmacy. 90 Osborn pleaded guilty
under the RCO doctrine to two counts
of misbranding and was sentenced to
one year of probation, which included
90 days of home detention, and a
$100,000 fine.91 The criminal conduct
involved the death of three patients in
2007 who died because of a colchicine92 overdose, which Apothécure
compounded. Osborn admitted that
as owner, he was “responsible for the
procedures and equipment” and for
ensuring that drugs were compounded
properly. However, neither the criminal information nor agreed-upon facts
presented to the court mention that
“Osborn was aware of any discrepancies with respect to the manufacture”
of the drug or aware “of specific issues
related to inadequate procedures or
deficient equipment in the intravenous
lab (IV lab).”93 The OIG did exclude
Michael Dinkel, owner and president
of Drew Medical, Inc., a diagnostic
imaging services provider in Orlando,
Florida, for improper billing and
false claims.94 Interestingly, the OIG
excluded Dinkel under section
1320-a7(b)(7) without a criminal
conviction95 and “[p]rior to the civil
settlement, OIG notified Dinkel that
OIG intended to exclude him.”96

Additionally, the OIG imposed a
five-year exclusion on the former CEO
of InterMune, W. Scott Harkonen,
M.D., in August 2011, after he was
sentenced for wire fraud for the creation and dissemination of a press
release to the public that contained
false and misleading information about
the efficacy of Actimmune (Interferon
gamma-1b) as a treatment for idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis (“IPF”).97
Although the clinical trial had failed,
InterMune’s press release falsely stated
that the results of the clinical trial
established that Actimmune helped
IPF patients live longer.98
Harkonen was convicted in a September 2009 trial and sentenced in
April 2011 to three years probation, six
months of home confinement, a
$20,000 fine, and 200 hours of community service. Federal prosecutors,
however, had urged ten years’ imprisonment and a $1 million fine,
maintaining in their sentencing memorandum that “executive suites and
board rooms of drug companies across
the U.S.” would recognize a “substantial
sentence,” which would “deter current
and future officers of drug companies.”99
Consequently, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
upheld Harkonen’s conviction for wire
fraud, rejecting his argument that the
press release “expressed a scientific
view” that is protected by the First
Amendment.100 Harkonen’s attorneys
indicated that he will seek en banc
review of his case.101
As a result of the conviction,
Harkonen’s exclusion was mandatory
under section 1128(a)(3) because he
was convicted of a felony “related to
fraud…in connection with the delivery of a health care item or service.”102
Harkonen, however, challenged his
exclusion to the HHS Departmental
Appeals Board (“DAB”), arguing that
his wire fraud conviction did not
have a connection to delivery of a
healthcare item or service. Specifically, Harkonen argued that the OIG

could not show that the statements in
the press release “affected a single
physician’s decision to prescribe
Actimmune.”103 He maintained that
the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
erroneously found a connection by
relying on a “purely hypothetical
‘potential impact’”104 and speculating
that the charged statements could have
caused a physician to prescribe Actimmune, despite the lack of evidence that
any physicians wrote prescriptions
based on the statements.105 Harkonen
explained how the “potential impact”
could only materialize if “multiple contingencies occurred,” the possibility of
which was “highly speculative.”106
Harkonen further argued that the
ALJ’s factual findings of a potential or
intended impact on delivery lacked evidentiary support because (1) the jury
acquitted him of the misbranding
charge; (2) the district court found
that the government had failed to
prove that the wire fraud offense
caused or was intended to cause a physician to write a single prescription of
Actimmune; and (3) the ALJ misconstrued the press release.107 Accordingly,
Harkonen asserted that because the
statements did not have any impact on
patients or insurers,108 the requisite
connection to delivery of healthcare
services or items was missing, and
therefore exclusion was improper.109
Harkonen also asserted that his exclusion violates the Fifth Amendment’s
Double Jeopardy Clause110 and the
Eighth Amendment’s protections
against cruel and unusual punishment.
The OIG responded that because
such statements were made “in an
attempt to increase the sale” of
Actimmune and in fact resulted in a
“dramatic increase in sales” the year
the press release was issued, the statements for which Harkonen was
convicted of had a connection with
the delivery of a healthcare item or
service.111 The OIG maintained that
the “exclusion statute does not
require a direct connection between
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the conviction and the delivery of a
specific health care item or service,
but instead requires a ‘nexus’ or ‘common sense analysis’ of whether the
offense had a connection with the
delivery of a health care item or service.” 112 Accordingly, the OIG
asserted that because the press release
“was intended to encourage physicians to prescribe, and patients to
take, Actimmune,” 113 such a nexus
existed. The OIG argued that the
DAB interprets the phrase “in connection with” to have the same
meaning as “related to” and construes
both terms broadly, relying on the
D.C. Circuit’s broad interpretation of
such terms in Friedman.114 Specifically,
the OIG argued that such broad construction “does not require that the
offense result in a delivery and therefore does not require an actual
delivery of an item or service.115
The DAB rejected Harkonen’s
arguments and sustained his exclusion. 116 The DAB maintained that
“the conduct underlying the criminal
offense does not necessarily have to
involve [the] actual delivery…of a
health care item or service to the
patient or beneficiary” for the OIG to
exclude an individual under section
1128(a)(3). 117 The DAB reasoned
that while “financial misconduct generally is not part of the actual delivery
of the item or service…it is related to
payment for…an item or service…
that was intended to be delivered.”118
Further, the regulations interpreting section 1128(a)(3) recognize that
exclusion is proper “even if the individual’s offense does not involve his/
her personally delivering an item
or service as an element of the
offense.”119 Thus, as long as the fraud
is “linked in a rational way to the
delivery of a health care item or service,” that offense falls under the
exclusion statute. 120 The DAB also
concluded that the exclusion did not
violate the “Double Jeopardy Clause
or the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment” because exclusions are “remedial in nature” and

necessary to “protect federal health
care programs and their beneficiaries
from individuals who have been
shown to be untrustworthy.”121 The
DAB upheld his exclusion because
the evidence showed that Harkonen
was “untrustworthy in representations
he made or caused to be made” about
Actimmune. 122 Harkonen has filed
suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California seeking to overturn the exclusion.123
Moreover, the OIG excluded
four former Synthes, Inc. executives
under section (b)(1) on October 18,
2012. The exclusions came almost a
year after the four executives were
sentenced to prison124 for their misdemeanor pleas as “responsible
corporate officers” for introducing
two misbranded devices – Norian XR
and Norian SRS, bone cement products – into interstate commerce. 125
The company and the executives
pled guilty in 2009. The government
alleged that the four Synthes executives conducted “unauthorized clinical
trials of two bone cements for an unapproved use, marketed the products
without first conducting clinical trials
required by FDA, continued to market
the products until three patients died
during surgeries in which the products
were used, and did not recall the products from the market because such an
action would have required them to
notify the FDA.”126
The government introduced
evidence of the executives’ “false,”
“fraudulent,” “deceptive,” and
“intentionally deceiving” conduct,
convincing the judge that there was
an “unparalleled” “pattern of deception.”127 The court characterized the
scale of the executives’ deception as
“extreme” and recognized that “[n]o
similar set of facts [could] be located in
the universe of Park doctrine cases,”128
which in turn contributed to his sentencing three of the defendants to
prison terms above the federal sentencing guidelines.129 Thus, unlike the
Purdue executives and unlike the
“standard Park-doctrine behavior, in

which an unaware corporate official is
held strictly liable for the conduct of
his subordinates,” the conduct here
involved the “direct, knowing, intelligent and intentional choices” made
by the executives.130
Two other incidents involving
potential FDCA violations are also
worth examining because of the
potential implications they may have
on future prosecutions of corporate
executives. First, in 2010 the government indicted Lauren C. Stevens,
former associate general counsel for
GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) on several
counts regarding her involvement in
various interactions and exchanges
with the FDA regarding drugs the
agency was investigating for off-label
promotion. 131 Stevens raised an
advice of counsel defense132 and while
her investigation was pending, sought
disclosure of “grand jury transcripts to
determine whether the government
properly instructed the grand jury” on
this defense.133 Although this indictment was dismissed, the government
indicted her again on the same
charges shortly after.134
At trial, the judge acquitted her,
asserting that the case “should never
have been prosecuted” and that it
raised “serious implications for the practice of law.”135 Importantly for in-house
and outside counsel of pharmaceutical
companies, the court recognized the
“enormous potential for abuse in allowing prosecution of an attorney for the
giving of legal advice.”136 As a result,
the decision called “into question the
wisdom, in a complex regulatory setting, of using non-administrative tools
– and particularly criminal process –
to secure individual compliance.”137
The second incident, in 2012,
involved the government’s failed
prosecution of Stryker Biotech Corporation and several of the company’s
national sales directors and regional
managers for off-label promotion and
concealment of adverse events.138 The
government alleged that Stryker had
deliberately misled surgeons and put
continued on page 8
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patients at risk through off-label promotion, and claimed to have evidence that
the individuals knew doctors were
being misled.139 Despite strong claims
from the government, defense counsel
for Stryker revealed that federal prosecutors “had failed to speak with any of
the surgeons…or victims.”140 Instead,
defense counsel spoke with the surgeons who were willing to testify that
no fraud or deceit had occurred; in fact,
the first witness testified that “doctors
mixed the two products in question,
because that is consistent with medical
practice, not because they had been
influenced by Stryker Biotech sales
reps.”141 As a result, the government
dismissed all charges against the individuals, including Mark Philip, who
was president from 2004 to 2008, and
settled the case against the company
with a single misdemeanor count of
misbranding a medical device.142 U.S.
Attorney Carmen Ortiz explained that
“doing justice meant dismissing the
charges, rather than subjecting these
individuals to a protracted trial where
the government could not put its
most effective case before the jury.”143
On the Horizon:
The OIG’s Next Steps
Pharmaceutical executives may
face even greater risk of exclusion in
the future, particularly because the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has
expressed increased interest in pursuing “individuals responsible for illegal
conduct just as vigorously” as the
agency pursues corporations. 144 In
fact, Nathaniel Yeager, Health Care
Fraud Chief of the U.S. Attorney’s
Office in Boston, “said that he was in
regular dialogue with HHS OIG on…
issues of exclusion.”145 Initially, the
OIG excluded Hermelin before he
was convicted due to evidence tying
him to the illegal conduct KV pled
guilty to. The OIG next excluded the
Purdue executives after they accepted
misdemeanor pleas under the RCO
doctrine for misbranding under the

FDCA. The OIG most recently
excluded the Syntheses executives
after their convictions under the
RCO doctrine.
The “next logical step” beyond
KV and Forest, according to current
Chief Counsel to the Inspector General Gregory Demske, is to “exclude
someone based on the fact [that] they
had been in a position of responsibility at a corporation when a crime
occurred, without…admission [that]
the individual was involved.”146 The
OIG essentially attempted this
approach with Forest and Solomon,
but the facts of that case may not have
been strong enough to pursue under
Demske’s new proposal, which may
explain why the agency backed down.
Nevertheless, Demske indicated
that the OIG was presently considering cases to determine when excluding
an executive would be appropriate,
and said the agency would use its
permissive exclusion guidance 147 in
determining whether to proceed.
Moreover, in its Top Management
Concerns, the OIG asserted that it
would consider “cases in which
excluding responsible corporate officers of sanctioned providers and
suppliers is appropriate” and will monitor “the effect of such an exclusion on
recidivism.”148 The OIG, however, said
it would not go back in time to previously settled cases and would only
pursue this option with “respect to
companies that were on notice before
they entered a plea or settlement.”149
Despite the potentially increased risk
to executives of exclusion, the OIG
likely will face difficulty bringing such
actions without new exclusion authority because sanctioned entities
typically have a new CEO and executive suite by the time the entity settles
with a criminal conviction.

CEO”151 because under section 1320
a-7(b)(15), the OIG may only permissively exclude an individual “who has a
direct or indirect ownership or control
interest in a sanctioned entity…or who
is an officer or managing employee of
such an entity.”152 Thus, the OIG cannot permissively exclude a corporate
executive or officer under section (b)
(15) who no longer has a direct or
indirect ownership or control interest
in the sanctioned entity or is no longer
an officer or manager of the sanctioned
entity. As a result, the universe of
potential executives subject to exclusion is limited, despite Senator
Grassley’s attempt to expand the
OIG’s permissive exclusion authority
to individuals with past ownership or
control interests in sanctioned entities or who were past officers or
managing employees.153 The court in
Friedman, however, expanded the
potential reach of exclusion for corporate executives, which may have
the effect of changing and improving
how executives manage and oversee
pharmaceutical companies.

Specifically, the OIG can “only
pursue [exclusion of] a person who is in
office of a convicted entity.”150 The
agency cannot “reach the former

Finally, corporate executives may
face new threats of exclusion by the
OIG under the recently finalized regulations implementing the Physician
Payment Sunshine Act – section
6002 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”).154
In general, the “Sunshine Act”
requires applicable manufacturers of
drugs, devices, biologicals, or medical
supplies (“AMs”) covered under
Medicare, Medicaid or the Children’s
Health Insurance Plan (“CHIP”) to
report annually to the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services
(“CMS”), in an electronic format,
certain payments or other transfers of
value (e.g., travel or meals) to covered
recipients – physicians and teaching
hospitals.155 CMS or the OIG may
penalize AMs that fail to report payments timely, accurately or completely.156
To ensure compliance, the Sunshine
Act requires specified corporate
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executives to attest to the accuracy and
completeness of the reported payment
information.157 Due to the tremendous
amount of payments that companies
will have to track and report, errors,
inaccuracies, and omissions are inevitable and the OIG may impute these to
the attesting officer.158
For example, the OIG may take a
broad interpretation of a knowing
failure to report or correct a payment
as a program-related crime that
requires mandatory exclusion, given
that CMS is implementing the Sunshine Act, coupled with the broad
definition of “related to the delivery
of a healthcare item or service” and
the Act’s legislative history and purpose to protect the integrity of
payments made by CMS.159 Thus, an
officer attesting to or an employee
contributing to such inaccurate
reporting could have committed a
program-related crime, which could
result in a mandatory exclusion under
42 U.S.C. § 1327a-7(a)(1). Alternatively, the OIG could consider a
reporting violation as a failure to supply payment information,160 a failure
to disclose required information
regarding ownership,161 or an offense
“relating to fraud…or other financial
misconduct,”162 which could result in
a permissive exclusion. If an entity is
sanctioned for non-compliance with
the Sunshine Act, the OIG may also
use section 1327a-7(b)(15) to
exclude a certifying officer who submitted the inaccurate payment
reports and should have known that
such reports had errors or omissions.

Friedman’s Expansion
of Exclusion Under the
RCO Doctrine
The three Purdue executives
appealed the OIG’s 20-year exclusion
determination to an ALJ. While on
appeal, the OIG reduced the exclusion
to 15 years because the executives had
assisted law enforcement authorities to
“combat abuse of OxyContin.”163 The
ALJ affirmed the 15-year exclusion as

being within a “reasonable range.”164
The executives appealed this decision
to the DAB, which affirmed the exclusion, only reducing its length to 12
years because there was no substantial
evidence that the misbranded Oxycontin had any adverse effect on
program beneficiaries and others.165
The Purdue executives then sought
review in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia, which also
upheld the exclusion.166 On appeal to
the D.C. Circuit, the Friedman case
presented the question of whether the
phrase “misdemeanor relating to
fraud” in section 1320a-7(b)(1)(A)
refers to a (1) generic criminal offense
– the categorical approach – or (2) to
the facts underlying the particular
defendant’s conviction – the circumstance-specific approach.167
The categorical approach “prohibits the later court from delving
into particular facts disclosed by the
record of conviction” and directs that
court to “look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of
the prior offense,” including the elements of that offense.168 Under the
“circumstance-specific” approach, by
contrast, the statutory term refers to
the particular conduct giving rise to
the conviction, so the court “must
look to the facts and circumstances
underlying an offender’s conviction”
to determine whether that conviction
is covered by the statute. 169 The
Appellate Court reasoned that the
text, structure, and purpose of the
exclusion statute indicated that the
Secretary’s circumstance-specific
approach was proper. The Court,
however, noted a “split in authority
on the question whether to defer to
an agency’s interpretation of a term
drawn from criminal law but used in a
statute the agency administers.”170
The key phrase in the exclusion statute the Court used to
uphold the executives’ exclusions
was “relating to,” which the court
broadly defined as “stand[ing] in
some relation; to have bearing or
concern; to pertain; refer; to bring

into association with or connection
with.” 171 Using this definition, the
Court reasoned that “relating to”
includes any criminal conduct that
has a factual “connection with or
reference to” fraud. 172 The Court
explained that “relating to fraud”
modifies “misdemeanor” and that a
“conviction” meant a particular event
on a particular occasion and “so refers
to a set of facts, and not to a generic
crime.” 173 Consequently, the Court
explained that “[m]isdemeanor misbranding does not necessarily require
a culpable mental state” like generic
misdemeanors “because a conviction
for the offense may be, and in this
case was, predicated upon the responsible corporate officer doctrine, which
entails strict liability.”174
Pointing to the “broad scope” of
section 1320a-7(b)(1)(A), the Court
used three examples to support its
position. First, the Court maintained
that exclusion for a misdemeanor
relating to “other financial misconduct” “expressly refers to a type of
‘conduct,’ not to a genus of criminal
offense.”175 Therefore, the term “misdemeanor” refers to the “particular
circumstances of an individual’s conviction, and ‘relating to’ must denote a
factual relationship between the conduct underlying the misdemeanor and
the conduct underlying a ‘fraud.’”176
Second, the Court reasoned that
the limiting clause in section 1320a7(b)(1)(B) “does not pick out a
generic class of offenses because there
is no generic crime of defrauding a
program other than a healthcare program financed in whole or in part by a
government agency.”177 As a result,
the Court explained that the “criminal offense” must “relate to fraud”
because it has a factual relationship to
conduct involving a program financed
by a government agency, committed
on a particular occasion.
Third, the Court explained that
the phrase “the use of funds” in section 1320a-7(b)(2)(ii) does not refer
to a generic offense and therefore
continued on page 10
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must refer to specific facts on a particular occasion. As a result, the
Court maintained that “related to”
in this provision denotes a factual
connection between an “investigation
or audit” and “the use of funds.”
Accordingly, the Court asserted that
“[t]he only reasonable interpretation
is that in all three provisions the
phrases refer to a factual relationship.”178 The Court also reasoned that
the heading of section 1320a-7(b)(1)
(“Conviction relating to fraud”) further supports this reading of the
provision.
The Court then evaluated the
three aggravating factors that the
OIG relied on to exclude the executives for 12 years: (1) the conduct
underlying the convictions lasting
more than one year, (2) the amount
of the financial loss, and (3) the significant adverse physical or mental
impact upon program beneficiaries.
First, the Court rejected the executives’ argument that there was no
financial loss because Purdue paid
$160 million in “restitution,” which
the executives admitted responsibility
for and because Purdue generated
almost $3 billion in revenues from
OxyContin during the time it misbranded the drug, much of which
came from federal and state healthcare
programs that would not have been
paid for but for the misbranding.179
Second, while the executives’
violations consisted solely of omissions, rather than “acts,” the Court
concluded that HHS’ interpretation
equating the two terms when only
“acts” are proscribed was a permissible
one.180 Third, the Court rejected the
executives’ argument that HHS gave
insufficient weight to their cooperation with law enforcement agencies
because the executives did not show
that the Secretary had abused her
discretion.181
The Court however, agreed with
the executives that there was substantial

evidence that HHS did not take into
account the executives’ lack of “conscious wrongdoing” as a mitigating
factor.182 The Court also found that
the length of the executives’ exclusion
was arbitrary and capricious because
(1) every case cited by HHS involved
a mandatory exclusion with a presumptive baseline of five years, not a
discretionary exclusion with a presumptive baseline of three years; (2)
every case cited involved either a felony or Medicare fraud conviction for
which the defendant was incarcerated, which was not present in this
case; and (3) “none of the cases cited
even concerned an exclusion under
section 1320a-7(b)(1),” and HHS
“had never excluded anyone for more
than ten years” based upon a misdemeanor; the longest was four years.183
The Court explained that “simply
pointing to prior cases with the same
bottom line but arising under a different law and involving materially
different facts does not provide a reasoned explanation for the agency’s
apparent departure from precedent.”184
Subsequently, the Purdue executives argued that a rehearing en banc
was justified because the “splintered
panel” adopted a circumstance-specific approach that ignored the
decisions of three circuits,185 which all
held that “‘offense relating to [specified
misconduct]’ in another exclusion statute requires a ‘categorical’ analysis
– i.e., the elements [not the facts] of
the conviction…must ‘relate to’ the
specified misconduct.”186 Specifically,
the executives argued that “exclusion
is authorized for an offense consisting
of a misdemeanor relating to fraud,”
and that the “offense,” not the factual
basis for a conviction, must “relate to”
fraud. 187 Further, the executives
asserted that the majority’s rationale
adopted an expansive “nexus” test
with “no meaningful limit” that will
have “sweeping implications for individual liberty interests” and conflicts
“with Supreme Court Precedent.”188

The executives also argued that
“by sustaining HHS’ application of its
‘financial loss’ aggravating factor[189]…
the majority” failed to explain or
identify any methodology HHS used
to determine how the executives’
omissions caused more than $5,000 in
financial losses or how such losses
justify a 12-year exclusion. 190 The
executives argued that the companynegotiated restitution had “no
connection to actual losses”191 and Purdue’s revenues for OxyContin sales
could not “substitute for a finding of
losses under a rational methodology…
since most sales did not result from
misbranding, which had no adverse
effect on beneficiaries.”192 Because the
record contained “no evidence of what
the losses were” and HHS “did not
articulate any comprehensible method
to estimate the losses,” the executives
argued that such “‘whimsical…reasoning’ be rejected.”193 Finally, the panel
erred in not giving the terms “acts” and
“omissions” “distinct meanings” when
the “exclusion statute and HHS regulations repeatedly distinguish” such
terms.194 Accordingly, these aggravating factors were inapplicable because
the executives “were convicted only for
omissions,” and thus, any equation of
these two terms was unwarranted
because repeated distinctions make the
language of the regulation unambiguous.195
In response, the government
replied that the use of a categorical
approach for “different provisions in
wholly unrelated statutes does not
warrant further review.”196 The government maintained that section
1320a-7(b)(1) expressly considers
“conduct, reflecting that Congress
cared about what Federal health care
program participants have done rather
than the elements of the crime with
which they were charged.”197 In fact,
section (b)(1) “contains no reference
to the elements of an offense.” 198
Moreover, the government argued
that “no generic crime of ‘financial
misconduct’” exists and that the use
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of “offense” and “crime” in the statute
“encompass the underlying acts, context and circumstances,” allowing
courts to look at “the facts and circumstances underlying the offender’s
conviction to determine if the offense
is within the scope of the statute.199
Further, the government maintained
that a “circumstance-specific approach
ensures that the Secretary can deter
and redress” financial misconduct and
breaches of fiduciary responsibility that
bear on “professional competence
[and] performance, or financial integrity,” which raise questions about
“trustworthiness and reliability.”200
The government also asserted
that while the three circuit courts
used a categorical approach for an
immigration statute, “those cases do
not govern every statute that includes
the phrase ‘related to’” and thus,
there is no circuit split.201 In addition,
the government argued that the panel
properly interpreted “relating to” as
meaning “[to] have a connection with
or reference to” which allows courts
to examine the facts and conduct
underlying the conviction. The government asserted further that the
financial loss-aggravating factor only
required a “reasonable expectation that
the conduct would cause losses over
$5,000,” which was demonstrated by
the $159 million settlement and executive bonus disgorgement.202 Finally,
the government maintained that
exclusions based on “culpable omissions” was consistent with “binding
precedent” and was a proper interpretation of the exclusion statute for the
“regulatory purpose of predicting
future trustworthiness based largely
on the extent and effects” of the
executives’ criminal behavior.203 Consequently, the D.C. Circuit denied the
executives’ petition for rehearing en
banc without an opinion.204

Recommendations for
the Industry
The Friedman case, coupled with
the OIG’s recent trend of excluding

executives, will have significant
repercussions for those in the healthcare industry for several reasons. First,
the decision likely will deter corporate healthcare executives from
agreeing to pleas under the RCO doctrine because doing so could lead to
exclusion, which would effectively
end their careers even where the
exclusionary period is significantly
less than 12 years. As a result, it may
be more difficult for the government
and corporate defendants to resolve
these types of cases through pleas,
which may lead to increased litigation
and related costs. Executives, however, may still be forced to accept
a misdemeanor plea because prosec u tors may threaten them with
indictments under a felony charge,
which could result in jail time as well
as mandatory exclusion.205 They may
also face pressure from corporate
boards or shareholders to “take one
for the team.”206
Second, a plausible defense under
the RCO doctrine is extremely difficult. The government need only prove
that the executive had supervisory
authority at the time the underlying
violations took place to convict senior
executives of an RCO offense. This
would be easy for prosecutors “once
the underlying violations have been
proven or admitted to by the corporation.” 207 Moreover, although Park
created the defense of objective
impossibility, 208 such a defense is
impractical.209 As a result, executives
faced with this situation may want to
“obtain advice from counsel separate
from the company’s counsel.”210
Third, “before an organization
pleads guilty, all counsel should scrutinize language in the statement of
the offense to reduce the quantity as
well as the quality of admissions that
could be used against an executive”
not only at sentencing, but also in a
debarment or exclusion proceeding.211
Companies that want to protect their
executives from exclusion may want
to refuse to agree to plea facts “suggesting false, misleading or deceptive

promotional practices by the company.”212 This is particularly important
because a guilty plea may have collateral consequences related to
“sentencing, business decision making,
shareholder derivative actions, and
Directors and Officers (“D&O”) insurance policies.”213 For example, U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines provide for
multiple level enhancements for
healthcare fraud offenses involving
losses exceeding $1 million.214
Additionally, counsel must investigate and advise clients about how a
criminal charge may affect the status
of a medical license.215 State law and
the rules of the applicable professional
licensing board govern licensure matters, and under such laws, offenses
associated with healthcare fraud may
raise issues of “moral turpitude.” 216
Accordingly, counsel should advocate
during settlement negotiations for “the
particular offense that best promotes
the defendant’s chances for avoiding
loss of licensure.”217
Fourth, publicly traded pharmaceutical companies must implement a
comprehensive strategy for dealing
with shareholders, particularly those
with significant holdings, due to the
potential challenges such shareholders
may bring if corporate executives are
implicated in criminal charges that
may lead to exclusion. For example, in
the case of the OIG’s proposed exclusion of Forest CEO Howard Solomon,
business magnate Carl Icahn – who
had acquired about seven percent of
Forest stock – nominated four directors
to the Forest board.218 In addition, the
union giant AFL-CIO, which also
controls a significant number of shares
in Forest Labs,219 called for Solomon’s
resignation and urged shareholders to
“withhold” their vote for him. 220
Accordingly, companies should have
in place clear and transparent policies
and procedures for dealing with the
potential suspension or removal of
board members or executives facing
charges or exclusion to avoid further
disruption from shareholders and
uncertainty from investors.
continued on page 12
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Fifth, executives may be less likely
to plead to misdemeanors without
assurances from the OIG as to exclusion. As a result, defense counsel should
focus on achieving a global resolution
early in negotiations by engaging all
government agencies involved, and if
possible, to negotiate a waiver of exclusion/debarment.221 Accordingly, counsel
should request a decision from the OIG
about exclusion before any individual
or organization pleads guilty, similar to
how corporate defendants negotiate the
terms of their CIAs before entering
criminal pleas or civil settlements.
“This request should be made even
when an investigation is closed without
a guilty plea because the OIG’s authority to seek permissive exclusion does
not require a criminal conviction.”222
The OIG likely will “resist the request
for an advance decision about exclusion
by claiming that it cannot exercise its
discretion until after the resolution of
criminal and civil matters.”223
This argument, however, is problematic because the OIG makes
decisions about exclusions for companies before such cases are resolved
by knowing enough about the investigation to accept the terms of the
CIA. Moreover, the case of Michael
Dinkel is precedent that the OIG
will make a decision about exclusion
before accepting a settlement. 224
Additionally, defense counsel may
“argue that a timely decision about
exclusion is a matter of due process
because the parties need to evaluate the
true impact of a proposed agreement
with the government.”225 If the OIG
continues to refuse, defense counsel
should negotiate a way to limit “the
number of individuals or the types of
positions that might be considered for
permissive exclusion,” and should ask
the OIG to render exclusion decisions
“within a certain period of time so that
the organization and the individuals
can plan their futures accordingly.”226

Sixth, individuals and companies
must proactively avoid debarment by
the FDA, which requires the agency
to refuse accepting any drug applications from the individual or entity.227
For the most part, an FDA debarment
has effects similar to exclusion in that
a debarred individual cannot assist or
provide services (either indirectly or
through employment) “in any capacity” 228 for a company that has an
approved or pending drug application
with the FDA.229 The mandatory provisions direct the FDA to debar an
individual who has received a felony
conviction for misconduct relating to
the development, approval, or regulation of a drug.230 The regulations also
give the FDA the discretion to permissively debar an individual for up
to five years for receiving a federal
misdemeanor or state felony conviction for conduct relating to the
development, approval, or regulation
of drug products, or if such individual
has been convicted of a felony unrelated to regulation of drugs that
involves certain crimes.231 The FDA
may consider several factors in determining debarment length.232 As there
may be increased risk for debarment
given the FDA’s recent reforms that
have improved the “quantity, efficiency, and transparency of its
debarment actions,”233 counsel should
negotiate to avoid such actions.
Seventh, Lauren Stevens’ experience offers several important factors
for in-house and outside counsel and
drug companies to consider moving
forward given the increased potential
use of the RCO doctrine. Specifically,
companies and counsel should (1)
work closely with a multi-disciplinary
team of attorneys who understand the
government entity with which they
are dealing; (2) encourage company
counsel to carefully consider whether
outside counsel should sign any submissions to government agencies;
(3) keep dialogue and tone with

government civil; (4) draft any written product – particularly those being
submitted to the government – with
an eye toward how a criminal investigator would interpret the writing with
full benefit of hindsight;234 (5) engage
outside counsel early on in an investigation to take advantage of the
attorney-client privilege and advice
of counsel defense; (6) make clear to
government officials from the outset
that the company will be relying on
advice of outside counsel; (7) create a
paper trail that documents the investigation process followed by in-house
counsel at the advice of or in coordination with outside counsel;235 and
(8) “thoroughly document not only
identified problems, but also the
responses to those problems.”236
Additionally, although it may be
difficult for other companies to apply
the Stryker Biotech case to their own
situation because of the unique factual circumstances, several problems
the government faced in that case
may be useful for counsel to consider.
To the extent facts or evidence allow
such arguments, counsel should look
for opportunities to (1) emphasize the
highly technical nature or skilled
training requirements of a product
that make a company’s influence over
an individual difficult to prove; (2)
demonstrate the safety of a product
through adverse event reporting and
detailed analysis of whether such
reports are minor; (3) show that relationships between sales representatives
and physicians are long-term; and (4)
point to market competition and
undermine notions of maximizing
short-term sales.237
Finally, to determine particular
risk exposure, companies should identify high-risk policies, practices, and
business lines as part of a comprehensive risk management and mitigation
program – requirements that many
CIAs already include. There should
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also be a procedure to “establish a
rapid response team to immediately
assess and contain any compliance
failure, as well as to escalate, resolve,
and self-report those failures as warranted.” 238 When such failure has
been identified and remedial measures
established, a “business-line supervisor should be designated (and the
designation documented) to monitor
implementation and provide periodic
reports to the legal/compliance function.”239 Moreover, companies should
establish policies and procedures for
“creating a comprehensive record of
corrective actions taken in response
to compliance incidents and which
senior personnel” take such actions.240
Companies should also establish
a system for periodic audits to identify
variations from company policies and
procedures and to determine, based
on audit findings, when such policies
and procedures “should be re-assessed
and personnel should be re-trained for
compliance.” 241 Further, companies
should consider requiring relevant
employees, officers, and executives to
“annually re-certify their understanding of and compliance with the
relevant policies and procedures.”242
This is particularly important given
that OIG Chief Counsel Gregory Demske recently emphasized that effective
healthcare boards are “active,” “raise
questions,” “stay informed on risk
areas,” “learn of all significant compliance issues,” and “attend compliance
training and speak to staff about compliance.”243 Companies may even want
to pursue RCO insurance policies to
“mitigate the economic loss of an RCO
prosecution or debarment.”244 Finally,
executives and employees responsible
for transparency and payment reporting
must exercise due diligence and establish explicit checks and balances at
every level of data collection to reduce
potential individual liability.245

Conclusion
Ultimately, the Friedman case
underscores “the government’s

expectation that upper management be
actively involved in ensuring corporate
compliance with federal healthcare
laws and regulations.”246 Two factors in
the OIG’s guidance on permissive
exclusion – the individual’s role and
response to the misconduct – demand
that corporate executives become
integrally involved in their company’s
compliance efforts to ensure that
affirmative steps are being taken to
minimize the risk of misconduct. Moreover, the recently amended Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations emphasize the use of corporate
compliance programs to facilitate
corporate transformation.247 Six pharmaceutical companies have already
developed a “set of principles on the
recoupment of executive incentive
compensation in the event of corporate compliance or other violations.”248
Now that the OIG has strong
precedent in both federal and
administrative court upholding
executives’ exclusions, coupled with
the FDA, the DOJ, and the OIG’s
recent emphasis on changing corporate behavior through the RCO
doctrine, healthcare executives face
new and real challenges. The Friedman and other RCO cases
demonstrate that a guilty plea could
potentially result in exclusion,
despite a lack of personal involvement in or even awareness of the
alleged misconduct, if there is a factual connection relating to fraud.
Accordingly, healthcare stakeholders will need “to work proactively
with the OIG prior to accepting a
guilty plea to better assess whether an
exclusion proceeding may occur subsequent to conviction.”249 Additionally,
companies will need to design,
develop, enhance, and implement
robust compliance initiatives based
on the factors outlined in the OIG’s
latest guidance on permissive exclusion, and the fact patterns underlying
recent RCO prosecutions, to minimize RCO liability of companies and
their executives, officers, and inhouse counsel.
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